Allison+Hume+D

Section 1: Photo Booth Interview

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Script

Q: Nice to meet you, Mr. Hume. Would you like to introduce yourself? Hello, and I am pleasure to have this interview. Before I start it, let me introduce myself briefly. My name is David Hume, and I’m an English philosopher. I’m mostly known of several philosophical works such as A Treatise of Nature, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and The Natural History of Religion. Well, I was born in 26 April, 1711 and I was educated at Edinburgh. In early 12, I went to Edinburgh university. I studies the first three years in there, after then I spent another three years of reading Greek and Roman classics. In 1734, I published my first work, A Treatise of Human Nature and I continued to publish books about philosophy. Q: Interesting. Now let’s start our interview. What did you tried to solve as a philosopher? I have thought this for several times about this topic: how we are able to make inductive inferences. Or in other words, this is also called as the problem of induction. Q: Can you please explain more about the problem of induction? Yes, I will continue to explain it. I was questioned how do people behave beyond the senses and the records of our memory. In life, we often behave to certain things to objects that are unobserved. As I was living my daily life, I realized that we believe naturally that things work as a regular manner. I didn’t know how did it worked, so I started to think about the solution. After then, I came up to a conclusion that the natural instinct of humans makes it possible. The natural belief is an objective causal. Q: Oh, I see. Then what are your philosophies? Well as a philosopher, I would state that humans impose their own orders according to the experiences from the outside world. This is divided into impression and idea. People could only base on their knowledge on these two factors. Without of it, people will not be able to assume anything. Impression would be considered as the actual perception, and idea is derived from the impression. These two are linked together with a chain called habits. This is called as the law of associations of ideas. Q: Lastly, what factors have influenced to you as a philosopher? Mostly, I was influenced by several empiricists, such as John Locke and George Berkeley. Since my thoughts were based on empiricism, maybe I would had several impacts from them. Also, French writers and English scholars gave me impact. Q: Thank you for your wonderful response, Mr. Hume. Thank you, and have a nice day.

Sources "David Hume." __Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia__. 8 Dec. 2008 . "David Hume." __Utilitarian Philosophers__. 8 Dec. 2008 . "DAVID HUME." __Oregon State University__. 8 Dec. 2008 . "David Hume." __World History: The Modern Era__. 2008. ABC-CLIO. 8 Dec. 2008 <[|http://www.worldhistory.abc-clio.com]>.

Section 2: Primary Sources

We find few disputes, that are not founded on some ambiguity in the expression; and 1 am persuaded, that the present dispute, concerning the dignity or meanness of human nature, is not more exempt from it than any other. It may, therefore, be worth while to consider, what is real, and what is only verbal, in this controversy. That there is a natural difference between merit and demerit, virtue and vice, wisdom and folly, no reasonable man will deny: Yet is it evident, that in affixing the term, which denotes either our approbation or blame, we are commonly more influenced by comparison than by any fixed unalterable standard in the nature of things. In like manner, quantity, and extension, and bulk, are by every one acknowledged to be real things: But when we call any animal //great// or //little,// we always form a secret comparison between that animal and others of the same species; and it is that comparison which regulates our judgment concerning its greatness. A dog and a horse may be of the very same size, while the one is admired for the greatness of its bulk, and the other for the smallness. When I am present, therefore, at any dispute, 1 always consider with myself, whether it be a question of comparison or not that is the subject of the controversy; and if it be, whether the disputants compare the same objects together, or talk of things that are widely different. In forming our notions of human nature, we are apt to make a comparison between men and animals, the only creatures endowed with thought that fall under our senses. Certainly this comparison is favourable to mankind. On the one hand, we see a creature, whose thoughts are not limited by any narrow bounds, either of place or time; who carries his researches into the most distant regions of this globe, and beyond this globe, to the planets and heavenly bodies; looks backward to consider the first origin, at least, the history of human race; casts his eye forward to see the influence of his actions upon posterity, and the judgments which will be formed of his character a thousand years hence; a creature, who traces causes and effects to a great length and intricacy; extracts general principles from particular appearances; improves upon his discoveries; corrects his mistakes; and makes his very errors profitable. On the other hand, we are presented with a creature the very reverse of this; limited in its observations and reasonings to a few sensible objects which surround it; without curiosity, without foresight; blindly conducted by instinct, and attaining, in a short time, its utmost perfection, beyond which it is never able to advance a single step. What a wide difference is there between these creatures! And how exalted a notion must we entertain of the former, in comparison of the latter! There are two means commonly employed to destroy this conclusion: //First,// By making an unfair representation of the case, and insisting only upon the weaknesses of human nature. And //secondly,// By forming a new and secret comparison between man and beings of the most perfect wisdom. Among the other excellencies of man, this is one, that he can form an idea of perfections much beyond what he has experience of in himself; and is not limited in his conception of wisdom and virtue. He can easily exalt his notions and conceive a degree of knowledge, which, when compared to his own, will make the latter appear very contemptible, and will cause the difference between that and the sagacity of animals, in a manner, to disappear and vanish. Now this being a point, in which all the world is agreed, that human understanding falls infinitely short of perfect wisdom; it is proper we should know when this comparison takes place, that we may not dispute where there is no real difference in our sentiments. Man falls much more short of perfect wisdom, and even of his own ideas of perfect wisdom, than animals do of man; yet the latter difference is so consider~ able, that nothing but a comparison with the former can make it appear of little moment.

"David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature (1739)." __ABC-CLIO Social Studies Databases__. 8 Dec. 2008 .

1) What are the weaknesses of human nature? 2) What are the two reasons that the philosophers at that time insisted as selfishness of man?

It is evident that none of the rules of composition are fixed by reasonings a priory, or can be esteemed abstract conclusions of the understanding, from comparing those habitudes and relations of ideas, which are eternal and immutable. Their foundation is the same with that of all the practical sciences, experience; nor are there any thing but general observations, concerning what has been universally found to please in all countries and in all ages. Many of the beauties of poetry, and even of eloquence, are founded on falsehood and fiction, on hyperboles, metaphors, and an abuse or perversion of terms from their natural meaning. To check the sallies of the imagination, and to reduce every expression to geometrical truth and exactness, would be the most contrary to the laws of criticism; be cause it would produce a work, which, by universal experience, has been found the most insipid and disagreeable. But though poetry can never submit to exact truth, it must be confined by rules of art, discovered to the author either by genius or observation. If some negligent or irregular writers have pleased, they have not pleased by their transgressions of rule or order, but in spite of these transgressions: They have possessed other beauties, which were conformable to just criticism; and the force of these beauties has been able to overpower censure, and give the mind a satisfaction superior to the disgust arising from the blemishes. Ariosto pleases; but not by his monstrous and improbable fictions, by his bizarre mixture of the serious and comic styles, by the want of coherence in his stories, or by the continual interruptions of his narration. He charms by the force and clearness of his expression, by the readiness and variety of his inventions, and by his natural pictures of the passions, especially those of the gay and amorous kind: And however his faults may diminish our satisfaction, they are not able entirely to destroy it. Did our pleasure really arise from those parts of his poem, which we denominate faults, this would be no objection to criticism in general: It would only be an objection to those particular rules of criticism, which would establish such circumstances to be faults, and would represent them as universally blameable. If they are found to please, they cannot be faults; let the pleasure, which they produce, be ever so unexpected and unaccountable. But though all the general rules of art are founded only on experience, and on the observation of the common sentiments of human nature, we must not imagine, that, on every occasion, the feelings of men will be conformable to these rules. Those finer emotions of the mind are of a very tender and delicate nature, and require the concurrence of many favourable circumstances to make them play with facility and exactness, according to their general and established principles. The least exterior hindrance to such small springs, or the least internal disorder, disturbs their motion, and confounds the operation of the whole machine. When we would make an experiment of this nature, and would try the force of any beauty or deformity, we must choose with care a proper time and place, and bring the fancy to a suitable situation and disposition. A perfect serenity of mind, a recollection of thought, a due attention to the object; if any of these circumstances be wanting, our experiment will be fallacious, and we shall be unable to judge of the catholic and universal beauty. The relation, which nature has placed between the form and the sentiment, will at least be more obscure; and it will require greater accuracy to trace and discern it. We shall be able to ascertain its influence, not so much from the operation of each particular beauty, as from the durable admiration, which attends those works, that have survived all the caprices of mode and fashion, all the mistakes of ignorance and envy.

"Modern History Sourcebook: David Hume: Of the Standard of Taste, 1760." __FORDHAM.EDU__. 8 Dec. 2008 <http://www.uri.edu/personal/szunjic/philos/Standard.htm

3) What did David Hume observed on human nature and taste?