Soo's+DBQ

Soo Choi (G)

DBQ: How effective was U.S. foreign policy during the period of 1945 - 1963 in combating Communist aggression in Europe and Asia? Use the documents and your knowledge of the period to construct your response.

The Cold War, the era from 1945 to 1963, was the time when the general American population was in fear and sensitivity in response to the "threats" from the USSR and its expansionist policies of the communist regime. The U.S. foreign policy to counter this movement abroad differed by the president at the time - from Truman to Eisenhower to Kennedy - and thus differed in its effectiveness at those times. While the Truman foreign policy marked by the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan was active and effective to rebuild the economy of European nations, Eisenhower's quiet, calm policy proved to be effective and ineffective differing on the diplomative, and Kennedy's policy was marked by its failure to stop the Arms Race first, and in the Bay of Pigs. The foreign policy of Truman took perhaps the most active and effective measures among those of all presidents. The key idea behind his policies was containment, conceived by George Kennan soon after WW2, intended to check the expansionist designs of the Soviet Union through economic, military, diplomatic, and political means (Doc B). The Truman Doctrine, which called for immediate economic and military aid to Greece that was threatened by a communist insurrection, and to Turkey which was under pressure from Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean (Doc A). By announcing such doctrine, Truman sought to protect those countries from falling under Soviet influence after Britain announced that it could no longer give them aid. In response to Truman's message, Congress appropriated $400 million in aid. The Marshall Plan was the epitome of this doctrine, being a four-year program proposed by U.S. Secretary of state George C. Marshall provided foreign assistance to seventeen western and southern European nations during World War II reconstruction (Doc F). This was a key factor in reviving their economies and stabilizing their political structures, proving the Truman Doctrine effective in benefiting the European nations and, in the process, blocking USSR advancement. In contrary to Truman's active foreign policies, Eisenhower preferred to work behind-the-scenes and relax tensions with the Soviets, which worked and didn't work on separate occasions (Doc D). Eisenhower's “new look” policy relied on massive retaliation to deter Soviet attacks, and while it was aimed to prepare U.S. to respond to a Soviet-backed conventional threat anywhere, it was not credible in the face of "less-than-total challenges" such as the Soviet intervention in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Also this policy was ineffective in that it provided U.S.S.R with an incentive to strike first to disarm the U.S. On the other hand, Eisenhower won Middle East trust by pressuring British and French withdrawal after their invasion of Egypt. Kennedy's policies, in essence, could be summarized as "militant anticommunism" - he announced such conviction in his inaugural address: “Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty” (Doc G, H) This "militant anticommunism" and its radicalism well present in Doc. E was, however, depicted as a failure when an operation sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) against Cuban communist leader Fidel Castro failed miserably when they were surrounded and defeated by the Cuban army. The 1,100 prisoners held by Castro were ransomed by the United States for $53 million in food and medical supplies, and this failed operation was known as the Bay of Pigs. While the foreign policies of U.S. (and especially its interventionist tendencies) has been deemed questionable by many critics, some of them - like the Truman Doctrine and its Marshall Plan - proved effective in many areas overseas. The fact that more extreme versions of foreign policies like Eisenhower's (in the calm end) and Kennedy's (in the aggressive end) can be a proof that policies are effective when they are right in between the calm and aggressive.